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The debate on the economic effects of the "aging bomb"  has been around us 
for  a while now;  ongoing demographic, political and economic trends suggest it 
will stay a while longer.  In this paper we examine and ultimately challenge the 
received  wisdom  on  this topic,  according to which the "explosion"  of the ag-
ing bomb will,  and should, inevitably bring down our unfunded pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG)  public pension systems.  Avoidance of the disastrous consequences of 
such a demise requires, again according to the received wisdom, a rapid transi-
tion to fully funded, or capitalised, pension plans.  We find this recommendation 
partial and, at the very end, unwise.  We tackle the problem head-on, by ques-
tioning  the basic  assumptions,  either factual  or  theoretical,  upon which  the 
received wisdom is  founded. 
To  understand the perspective adopted, it may be useful to begin with a 
simplified, and probably unfair, summary of what we view as the "established 
consensus"  on this matter.  With all the apologies of the case, and in order to 
avoid an excessively long bibliography, we refer to World Bank [1994]' BIS [1998] 
and the literature quoted therein, for  a more detailed and precise articulation 
of such view. 
The demographic trends are such that during the next 30  to 50  years, the 
elderly dependency ratio (which, for the purposes of this paper is defined as the 
ratio of population aged 60  and older to the population aged 20-59 years) will 
keep growing and probably double the current, already high, levels.  Indeed, this 
is  part of a long run trend, dating back to the second half of the last century. 
This process has accelerated in the last twenty years and current extrapolations 
imply a further acceleration during the next three to four decades.  Under the 
pension systems prevailing in the EU,  this translates into continuous growth 
of the pension burden, as  measured by the ratio of total pension payments to 
GDP. 
Financial unsustainability is due to the fact that:  (i)  old-age and survivors 
pensions represent already a large fraction of GDP (more than 12 percent in the 
EU, as of 1995); (ii)  they are being financed almost entirely with a tax on labor 
income; and (iii)  reasonable projections (see below, Sections 2 and 3 for further 
details)  put the pension burden well  above  20  percent of GDP within a  few 
decades.  In the EU, the presence of the so-called "Stability and Growth Pact" , 
limiting the size of acceptable deficit to GDP ratios, will force countries to raise 
taxes in order to finance the increasing pension outlays.  Collecting such a large 
share of national income through social security contributions will raise labor 
cost dramatically, reduce employment and generate social and political unrest. 
Further,  maintaining alive  a  PAYG  pension system reduces  current savings, 
1 t~ereby damaging the growth of income  and employment  and increasing the 
SIze of the social security tax which the working few will have to pay. 
Various  reform proposals have  been advanced,  which  are  consistent  with 
the previous scenario and try to cope with the problems "it  envisages  (beside 
the World Bank's and Bank for International Settlements' volumes cited above , 
see also Davis [1998],  Diamond [1997],  European Commission [1997],  Feldstein 
[1996],  Feldstein and Samwick [1998],  Holzmann [1997],  Kotlikoff [1995,  1996], 
Mitchell and Zeldes [1996] among other).  A characterising common feature of all 
these proposals is that, starting with the second decade of the next millennium , 
old-age pensions should not be financed,  as  they are today,  through a tax on 
earnings but instead through the annuities generated by financial assets which 
are titles to the existing stock of productive capital. 
The intuition behind this recommendation is  straightforward.  Total earn-
ings, upon which taxes are levied to finance pension payments, have been grow-
ing rather slowly during the last two decades (about 2 percent a year in the EU, 
since the middle 1970s) and, given current trends, they are bound to grow at a 
similar pace in the foreseeable future.  On the other hand, the growth rate of the 
market value of private investments, as measured by the growth rate of stock 
market indexes, has been much higher (around 10 percent a year in real terms 
in  the EU, since  the early 1980s)  and is  not expected to drop in the future. 
Consequently, working people that are currently planning to provide for  their 
retirement income by means of future public pensions are putting their eggs 
in the wrong basket.  Barring an unlikely sharp increase in future contribution 
rates, the rate of return they will earn on their social security contributions may 
be between one fourth and one sixth of the one they would earn by investing 
their money in the stock market or in an appropriate mixture of stocks and 
bonds. 
According to its proponents,  such a  reallocation of resources  away  from 
PAYG contributions and toward financial assets would eliminate many short-
comings of the current systems. Funded systems have the following advantages. 
First, demographic oscillations would no longer affect the financial viability of 
pension payments.  Second,  political meddling with retirement income would 
also be eliminated. Third, private saving and investment would receive a boost, 
thereby fostering economic growth.  Overall,  a more efficient  allocation of re-
sources  would  be achieved.  In  particular, Feldstein  [1995]  provides  a  list  of 
conditions under which  a shift from  an unfunded to a funded system should 
raise social welfare.  These are:  (i)  a positive growth rate of the economy, (ii)  a 
rate of return on capital higher than the growth rate of national income;  (iii) 
a rate of return on capital higher than the rate of time preference.  Abundant 
statistical evidence (see, for example, Table 8 below) shows that conditions (i) 
2 and (ii)  are easily satisfied in the EU countries.  The large flows of private saving 
toward financial markets during the last two decades, suggest that (iii)  is  also 
likely to be true. 
Why, then, is such an efficiency-improving reform proposal in need of further 
examination?  We  claim that the  "consensus view"  just described is  seriously 
incomplete in its diagnosis of the deficiencies of PAYG systems, somewhat bi-
ased in its description of the merits of the fully funded ones, and off the mark 
in identifying the structural factors which are making unfunded systems finan-
cially unsustainable.  Thus, the first aim of this paper is to point out a number 
of theoretical and empirical reasons why the "consensus view" is an incomplete 
and biased description of reality.  The second aim is to provide a more complete 
analytical framework for  thinking about social security reforms in Europe. 
The idea that a complete shift to a fully funded system would be a blessing 
is grounded upon the following four statements, which are generally seen either 
as undisputed facts or obvious theoretical assumptions: 
(a)  The projected dramatic increase in the pension burden is mainly due to a 
demographic shock, which can be avoided only by abandoning the PAYG 
systems. 
(b)  A transition to a fully  funded system can be engineered without a sub-
stantial reduction in the pension payments of the currently retired and of 
the cohorts that are due to retire during the next 30 years. 
(c)  The growth rate of total earnings is  bound to be less  than the rate of 
return on capital for  the indefinite future. 
(d)  Barring the unlikely case of a "dynamically inefficient equilibrium" (corre-
sponding to the situation in which the rate of return on capital is smaller 
than the growth rate of earnings) a socially efficient pension system should 
be completely or almost completely based upon a capitalization scheme. 
We claim the previous assumptions or stylized facts should be replaced with 
the following: 
(A)  The projected increase in the pension burden is  due for  a 25  percent to 
demographic  factors  and to a  75  percent to deterioration of the labor 
market conditions and growing generosity. 
(B)  A transistion to a fully funded system cannot be achieved without a sub-
stantial reduction in current pension payments unless it is  financed  by 
issuing public debt.  The gains from such transition would accrue to gen-
erations that are not yet born. 
3 (C)  It is  likely that the growth rate of earnings will  continue to be smaller, 
on average,  than the rate of return on capital.  By the same token,  the 
standard deviation of the first  will  remain much lower than that of the 
second.  Also,  historical  patterns show  the two  returns  are  negatively 
correlated. 
(D)  A socially efficient pension system should be a mixed one, partly funded 
and  partly PAYG.  The relative  weights  of the two  systems should  be 
adjusted slowly, in accordance with the movements of the rates of return 
on physical and human capital, and their correlation. 
To contrast the four pairs of claims (a-A)  (d-D) , we proceed as follows. 
In Section  2  the reader will  find  data describing  the current systems of 
Social Protection in the EU and, in particular, the Old-age pension plans.  We 
also  report demographic  and labor market  projections,  up to year 2050,  for 
each country.  Our cursory description of these variables confirms that, rebus 
sic  stantibus,  current  European systems of contributory public  pensions  are 
financially doomed.  We  claim that, beside the demographic, two other factors 
play a  fundamental role:  (i)  the sharp reduction in labor force  participation 
rates and the increase in unemployment rates over the last two decades;  (ii) 
the practice of increasing outstanding real pensions at the same pace at which 
labor productivity grows.  The simulations of Section 3 provide a quantitative 
evaluation of how critical the last two factors might be.  From these simulations 
we  conclude that (A) is a much more appropriate description of the facts than 
(a). 
Our next finding, developed in Section 4, supports claim (B) over (b). It is 
based both upon simple logical considerations (developed first in Breyer [1989] 
and then extended by various  authors)  and upon the few  studies that have 
began to quantify the implications of a transition from unfunded to fully funded 
systems (especially Holzmann [1998],  Miles  [1999],  Miles and Iben [1998J  and 
Miles and Timmermann [1999]).  The logical reasoning argues that, even if the 
growth rate of earnings is permanently lower than the rate of return on capital, 
once a  PAYG system is  in place it is  not possible to shift to a  capitalization 
system and make future generations better off without making at least one of 
the intermediate generations worse off.  This has serious critical implications 
for  those reform proposals, like the one recently advanced in Feldstein [1999J, 
that advocate investing social  security contributions in the stock market  as 
an almost painless way of avoiding the future pension burden.  Further, the 
quantitative exercises  we  just mentioned show that the benefits from  a  new 
funded system will  accrue only to generations that are barely or not even yet 
born,  while financing  the transition requires that large costs be paid by the 
4 generations that are currently alive.  This confirms the obvious fact  that free 
lunches are not available, not even in the case of social security reforms.  It also 
suggests that the political viability of a drastic transition  i~ quite low,  at least 
in democratic and politically complex countries like those belonging to the EU. 
Policies to spread costs and benefits in a homogeneous way across generations 
should therefore be designed. 
The second half of Section 4 considers statements (c)  and (C).  These are 
not strictly in contrast to each other.  The first stresses that expected rates of 
return on stocks are higher than the growth rate of GDP, and likely to remain 
so.  The second only reminds us that when investing in risky assets we  should 
check, at the least, first and second moments of the joint distribution of returns. 
Further, from optimal portofolio theory it recalls that correlations among rates 
of return are very important in determining the composition of the portofolio 
itself. 
This requires investing in assets other than physical capital to provide for 
income during old age.  In Section 5 we show why human capital (of which future 
earnings represent total returns) is the first and most natural candidate among 
such  assets.  We  show  how  integrated public  education and PAYG  pension 
systems can be used to achieve the efficient level of investment in human capital 
and the accrual of its returns to the old age people who have carried out this 
investment previously.  This simple, but quite general, theoretical model shows 
that a pension system which is purely based upon capitalization cannot achieve 
either static or dynamic efficiency.  In the light of this, we reconsider Feldstein's 
[1995]  theoretical argument  about the Pareto superiority of funded systems. 
The conclusion is  that Feldstein's claim fails  not just when the transitional 
costs  mentioned earlier  are  taken into  account,  but  also  when comparing a 
growth path with a fully  funded pension system to one with a  mixed PAYG 
and fully funded system.  Hence, even if transition were costless, we would not 
want to implement a complete shift from PAYG to capitalization. 
The logic  behind this argument extends to a  context of uncertainty and 
optimal portfolio allocation. This claim is not entirely new.  As far as we know, 
it originates with Merton  [1983]  and,  since  then,  it has been elaborated by 
Merton and co-authors in various instances.  What is  new is  the logical  and 
practical connection we  establish between public investment in education and 
payments of future retirement pensions.  We argue that a logically correct and 
socially efficient approach to reforming pension systems takes public financing 
of education (and not social security contributions) as the investment of which 
old age pensions represent the due return.  Hence our insistence upon the fact 
that, while the growth rate of earnings may be lower than the rate of return 
on physical capital, its riskiness is also remarkably lower.  Further, the negative 
5 correlation between the two returns suggests that, in a well diversified portfolio, 
one may want to assign positive weights to both assets.  From all this we draw 
support for statement (D)  as opposed to (d). 
To summarize, our reappraisal of the future of public pension systems and 
our rebuttal of, or more properly: improvement upon, the received wisdom pro-
ceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the current situation and simulate the 
expected future one,  up to year 2050,  assuming current trends and legislation 
do not change.  In Section 3 we  perform a similar exercise for some alternative 
scenarios, in all which a PAYG system is maintained but in which labor market 
conditions are changed and generosity mildly contained.  In Section 4  we  ar-
gue, using contributions from other researchers, that the transition from PAYG 
to fully funded cannot be strictly Pareto improving and that, in any case,  its 
benefits wiIl  accrue only to generations that are not yet born.  In Section 5 we 
propose a general analytical framework, consistent with our previous findings, 
for  thinking about the design of efficient  pension systems.  The practical and 
political implications of our overall analysis are elaborated in the conclusions, 
Section 6. 
2  European pension systems: the facts and the cur-
rent debate 
In this section we describe the current situation of pension systems in the EU. 
First, we  briefly describe the relevance of social protection expenditures (SPE, 
hereafter),  emphasizing the prominent role of pensions as  the major item in 
the social budget.  Second,  we  document the demographic and labor market 
scenarios under which pension systems are expected to operate in the forth-
coming decades.  Finally, we  briefly describe the main institutional features of 
European pension systems.  In particular, we  highlight their implications for 
both the rates of return that PAYG systems may provide to future pensioners 
and for the ratio between average pension and average labor productivity we 
should expect, on average, under the current institutional rules. 
2.1  Social Protection Expenditures 
Social protection expenditure represents a major part of public spending in all 
EU countries although,  as shown in Table 1,  there are important differences 
across countries in its size and composition.  Overall, in 1995, SPE amounted 
to  28.4  percent of GDP and  52.2  percent of total government expenditures 
in the EU.  As  a share of GDP, SPE is  lowest in the Southern countries and 
Ireland  (around 20  percent), and highest in the Nordic countries (around 35 
6 percent).  The level  of SPE per capita (measured  in  PPS units)  also  varies 
markedly between Northern and Southern EU countries (from under 2.500 PPS 
in Greece and Portugal and about 3.000 PPS in Spain and Ireland, to over 6.000 
in Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden).  This pattern of variation is broadly in 
line with the levels of GDP per capita, shown in the fourth column of the table. 
Turning to the contribution of old-age and survivors pensions to SPE, the 
last two  columns of Table 1 report the ratio of pension expenditures to SPE 
and to  GDP.  Excluding  Greece  (for  which  data are  not  available),  pension 
expenditures in  1995  amounted on  average  to  42.4  percent of SPE and 12.1 
percent of GDP. In all  EU countries, except Ireland (where the proportion of 
elderly people is much lower than elsewhere in the EU), old-age and survivors 
pensions represent by far the largest component of SPE, ranging from 32 percent 
in Finland to 63  percent in Italy (the country with the largest proportion of 
retired population in the EU).1 
2.2  Demographic and labor market scenarios 
2.2.1  The demographic scenario 
This section compares the current demographic structure of the EU economies 
taking into account the evolution of fertility rates and life expectancy over the 
period 1960-95. Demographic projections of the relevant dependency ratios for 
the period 1995-2050 are then presented. 
Total population in the EU (including Eastern German Landers) was  315 
millions in 1960.  The corresponding figure  nowadays is  374 millions, yielding 
an average annual growth rate of .45  percent.  This average growth, however, 
conceals marked differences across decades:  .8  percent in the 1960s, .4 percent 
in the 1970s, .25 percent in the 1980s and .4 percent again in the 1990s.  In spite 
of the recent slight recovery of population growth rates, mostly due to rising 
net migration into Europe and to increases in fertility rates in the Scandina-
vian countries, demographers seem to agree that the prospect is one of a clear 
deceleration of population growth in Europe. 
Current trends in fertility are documented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. 
There has been a large decline in fertility rates which has been the strongest 
where fertility rates were initially the highest (Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain). As for life expectancy, columns (3)  and (4) show a large increase in 
the 1960-95 period.  As for fertility, there is a negative relation between initial 
1  The figure for Italy is slightly biased upward as it includes the so-called "Compensation 
for  Termination of Contract"  ("Trattamento di Fine Rapporto" or TFR), which consists of 
a  lump-sum payment to be received upon dismissal.  This kind of payments either does not 
exist in other countries or is included in other functions of social protection. 
7 levels and successive variations.  Thus, dispersion across EU countries in both 
fertility and life expectancy has decreased noticeably. 
Table 3 provides a synthetic comparison of the current demographic struc-
ture of the EU countries, along with its future evolution as implied by Eurostat's 
baseline demographic projections (Eurostat [1996]).  The indicators presented 
are the youth dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of people aged less than 20 
to the working age population (people aged 20-59), and the old-age dependency 
ratio, defined as  the ratio of people aged 60+ to the working age population. 
If we  consider the current situation, two groups of countries are recognisable, 
as well as two outliers, Ireland and Italy.  For the first group (Belgium, Greece, 
France,  Spain,  Sweden  and UK)  both dependency ratios are above  average, 
whereas for  the second group (Austria,  Denmark,  Germany and the Nether-
lands) both are below average.  Ireland and Italy are unique cases, the first one 
because of its relatively high youth dependency ratio and relatively low old-age 
ratio, and the second one because of its relatively high old-age dependency ratio 
and relatively low youth dependency ratio.  This asymmetry should be kept in 
mind when considering the simulations that we  present later in this paper. 
In all  countries,  old-age dependency ratios are expected to increase sub-
stantially relative to their 1995  levels,  and  nearly double by the year 2050. 
Youth dependency ratios should instead fall slightly between now and the year 
2020, and then come back somewhat.  When analysing old-age ratios, Belgium, 
Finland and Italy are expected to have the largest dependency ratios in 2020, 
whilst Spain, Italy and Ireland will face  the most severe old-age demographic 
pressure in year 2050,  with ratios above 80  percent of the working age popu-
lation.  Changes in the youth ratios are much smaller,  with the exception of 
Ireland, where the dependency ratio is expected to fall by almost 20 percentage 
points between 1995 and 2020, and then stay at this lower level. 
2.2.2  The labor market 
We  now compare the EU countries in terms of labor force  participation and 
unemployment rates.  We look at both indicators by sex and age groups over 
the 1980-95  period.  As  shown in Tables 4  and 5,  labor force  participation 
rates (LFPRs) among the youth have been decreasing whereas unemployment 
rates for all age groups have been increasing, resulting in shorter contribution 
periods to the pension systems.  Second, LFPRs among the elderly have fallen 
substantially, particularly among men.  This also shortens contribution periods 
and increases the demand for pensions. Further, the incidence of unemployment 
among the elderly is much higher nowadays, which increases the pressure on the 
pension systems to become a substitute for unemployment benefits as a source 
8 of income for  elderly unemployed workers. 
A closer look at Table 4 reveals marked differences across countries.  South-
ern European countries have the lowest youth LFPRs, whereas Nordic countries 
have the highest LFPRs among the elderly.  For the central age groups, the main 
differences arise from the behaviour of women, whose LFPRs are lowest in the 
Southern countries.  As  regards the differences in activity rates by gender,we 
find  that the gap between male and female  LFPRs is  relatively small in the 
Scandinavian countries, particularly for  ages over 45, whilst there still are size-
able differences in Belgium, Ireland and the Southern Mediterranean countries. 
Figure 1,  in turn depicts the probability that a worker of a given age  in the 
range 45-69 will  retire within one year.  That probability is  measured by the 
slope of the current age-participation profiles.  The noticeable presence of peaks 
at particular ages  (typically 60 or 65)  is  related to the institutional rules gov-
erning retirement in the various countries, and, in particular, to the presence of 
early and normal retirement ages.  This effect seems to be particularly strong 
for  France,  Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  Finally,  the unemployment 
rates in Table 5 do not need much comment, as the incidence of unemployment 
has increased across the board. 
2.3  Early retirement and youth unemployment:  Is there any 
relationship? 
In the previous section, we highlighted a general trend towards reduced employ-
ment rates among elderly workers.  To  a large extent, this reflects deliberate 
government's policies and is  probably the single most damaging factor for  the 
long-run financial  sustainability of PAYG  pension schemes.  Besides,  it is  an 
important source of differential treatment for similar workers and, therefore, a 
major tool for  political rent-seeking and vote-buying. 
Quite often, policies that favor early retirement are supported and promoted 
with the justification that they may induce a reduction in youth unemployment 
rates. The basic idea is that since jobs are a scarce resource available in a fixed 
number,retiring an older worker would "free" the same job for a younger, most 
likely unemployed, one. 
To test this prediction, we have collected various labor market observations 
for  a sample of 260 NUTS Il and NUTS III  European regions over the years 
1986, 1991 and 1996.  They represent relatively small areas, which happen to be 
the territorial units at which the European Commission targets its employment 
policies  and for  which national governments tend to devise  the early retire-
ment plans we  mentioned earlier.  Hence one would expect that, if any effect 
is  visible, it should be detectable at this level of geographical disaggregation. 
Figures 2 and 3 plos, separately for  men and women, the relationship between 
9 the exit rates from the labor force of people born between 1931  and 1940  and 
the changes in the unemployment rates over  1991-96 of people aged between 
21  and 30.  Under the substitution hypothesis we should expect a negative rela-
tionship.  Neither for men nor for women,the estimated regression lines turn out 
to be significantly negatively sloped.  For alternative specifications,controlling 
for  cohort effects  or using different  lags,  the results hardly change.  Thus,we 
conclude that early retirement of older workers does not come together with a 
reduction of unemployment among younger ones. 
2.4  The institutional framework 
Although pension systems come in a wide variety of forms, they mostly fit into 
two categories:  (i)  unfunded PAYG systems, and (ii)  funded systems.  Within 
these two  categories,  plans differ  in their coverage  and other characteristics. 
Plans may be designed to cover all citizens, either in need of assistance or not, 
or only those contributing to a social insurance scheme.  As for  contributions 
and benefits, they may be flat-rate (Beveridge formula) or earnings-related (Bis-
marckian formula) or, as in the Scandinavian countries, of both types. On top 
of public pensions, many EU countries have also set up supplementary schemes, 
which may be either voluntary or compulsory, funded or unfunded, and which 
are often organized  according to an occupational,  employment-related  base. 
Obviously,  retirement income  may also  be provided through private pension 
funds,  which  are regulated and taxed differently in  each country.  With the 
exceptions of the UK, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, private 
pension funds still provide for  a  very low fraction of total retirement income. 
Table Al in the appendix provides a  brief summary on the relative weight of 
the various layers in the current pension systems in the EU countries. 
The interaction among the many layers of different pensions systems makes 
it difficult  to characterize their structure.  Nonetheless,  Table A2  in the ap-
pendix provides again a summary the main rules satisfied by earnings-related 
plans.2  Public earnings-related pension systems are usually mandatory and 
cover most employees.  Under these schemes, pension benefits are financed by 
the contributions of employees and employers.  The relevant parameters char-
acterising these systems are the contribution rates, the minimum contribution 
period needed to qualify for  benefits, the standard age of entitlement (which, 
together with life expectancy, determines the duration of benefits), the replace-
ment rate (that is,  the ratio of initial pension benefits to final  earnings), the 
indexation rules, and the amount of benefits going to survivors. 
2  A detailed discussion of institutional features is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer 
the interested reader to European Commission (1997) and the literature quoted therein. 
10 These parameters in Table A2  can be used to compute, for  each plan, the 
internal rate of return (IRR, hereafter) and the ratio between average pension 
(p)  and labor productivity (y),  given  age,  work  seniority,. and earnings  pro-
files.  When compared to the growth rate of the total wage  bill,  the IRR is 
an indicator of the long-run financial sustainability of a  pension plan.  For  a 
given contribution rate, if the average IRR is  systematically greater than the 
growth rate of total labor income,  additional resources are needed to finance 
pensions (see  Samuelson,1975).  The ratio between average pension and labor 
productivity, together with the elderly dependency ratio which we have already 
examined, determines the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP and therefore 
drives the overall financial sustainability of the system. 
Table 6 gives some rough estimates of IRRs and of the ratio of pension to 
average productivity for some ED countries in order to have a first check on the 
sustainability of the current pension plans.  The IRR is defined as the discount 
rate that makes the present discounted value of the flow of pension benefits equal 
to the present discounted value of the flow of social security contributions.  To 
get some feeling  about the size of the IRRs and the ratio of average pension 
to average labor productivity that generations currently entering into the labor 
market will get in the future from public pension systems if their current rules 
( i. e. contribution rates, method of pension calculations, etc.)  are kept invariant, 
we make the following simplifying assumptions: 
•  contribution rates are taken to be constant at their current levels  (see 
Table A.2); 
•  the length of the contribution period is  taken to be 35  years (which for 
most countries is higher than the average working period implied by the 
employment rates in Tables 4 and 5); 
•  the length of the retirement period is current life expectancy at 60  years 
(see Table 2); 
•  pension benefits are computed according to current rules which, in most 
cases, relate the pension replacement rate to the length of the contribu-
tory period and the worker's average earnings during a given period (see 
Table A.2 and column 2 of Table 6); 
•  pensions are determined by the replacement ratio plus the ongoing index-
ation rule in each country (see Table A.2); 
•  real wages  increase at the same rate as labor productivity, both during 
the contributory and the retirement periods. Labour productivity growth 
is taken to be 1.5 percent, as in Roseveare et al.  (1996). 
11 According to our estimates, the IRRs implicit in the current rules of the 
systems, range from about 2 percent in Germany and Italy3 to about 5 percent 
in  Sweden  (where the contribution rate for  the  employm~nt earnings-related 
scheme is fairly low).  With future productivity and employment growing at 1.5 
and 0.54  percent respectively, the growth of the wage bill would be below the 
IRRs we  have computed (except possibly for  Italy).  This implies that either 
additional financial resources need to be devoted to cover pension expenditures 
or contributions need  to be raised and/or pension benefits lowered  to avoid 
permanent deficits in the current pension systems. 
As for the ratios of average pension to average labor productivity, our cal-
culations yield  values  ranging from  about 30  percent in France to about 65 
percent in Spain, where the replacement rate (100 percent of the average wage 
in the last 15  years of the working life)  is  by far the largest in the sample of 
countries considered.  Overall, these ratios are not too far from those currently 
observed in the EU countries (with the exceptions of Spain and PortugaI), as 
can be seen in Figure 4.  Thus, if current rules are maintained, the only reason 
why the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP will increase is  the rise in the 
dependency ratios. 
2.5  The future of current systems:  A  simulation 
We  conclude our description by providing a  quantitative evaluation of the fi-
nancial distress that European public pension systems are expected to suffer 
over the next fifty  years.  We do this by presenting crude simulations of how 
the pension burden, namely the ratio between total pension expenditures and 
GDP, would behave should current trends and legislation be maintained. 
Our simulations are based upon the following decomposition of the pension 
burden 
P  No  p 
Y  =  Ne 'y' 
where P  is  pension expenditure (defined  as expenditure for  old-age and sur-
vivors  benefits),  Y  is  GDP, No  is  the number of the elderly  (conventionally 
defined as those aged 60+), P =  P / No  is average pension expenditure per el-
derly person,5 Ne  is  the number of employed workers, and y  =  Y/Ne is  labor 
productivity (GDP per employed worker).  This may also be rewritten in the 
3  Calculations for Italy are based on the system introduced with the 1995 reform which, 
however, will only be phased in very gradually. 
4  Even the 0.5 percent employment growth figure may be too optimistic since, everything 
else alike, labor force is expected to decrease in the EU15 over the near future. 
S  Notice that p  is  not the same as the average old-age pension of a  retired worker,  as P 
includes both cash benefits (periodic and lump-sum payments) and benefits in kind, whereas 
No includes both pensioners and other elderly people.  The use of p is mainly dictated by data 
availability and the desire to keep our model as simple as possible. 
12 following useful way: 
P  d  p 
Y  a(l - u)  . y' 
where d =  Nol  N  is the dependency rate, a =  Nal  N  is the aggregate LFPR and 
u  =  Nu/Na is  the unemployment rate, with N, Na  and Nu  being the working 
age population (defined here as those aged 20-59), the active population and 
the number of unemployed, respectively. 
Given assumptions about the future values of the old age dependency ratio 
d,  the labor force participation rate a,  the unemployment rate u, and the ratio 
ply between pension expenditure per elderly person and labor productivity, one 
may use the above relationship to obtain predictions about the future pension 
burden. In the baseline simulation presented in this subsection, we adopt Euro-
stat demographic projections for  the period 1995-2050 and make the following 
assumptions about a,  u and ply. 
(1)  age-specific  LFPRs and unemployment rates for  both men and women 
remain constant at their current levels for  all future cohorts; 
(2)  both average labor productivity y and average pension expenditure p grow 
at an annual rate of 1 percent, thereby keeping the ratio ply constant. 
The second assumption is not too far from the observed evidence during the 
period 1983-95 which, for  most EU countries, shows no clear sign of trends in 
the ply ratio (Figure 4). 
Our baseline simulation represents the extreme case of pure demographic 
effects,  with no changes in participation and unemployment rates by sex and 
age, and no changes in the ratio between average pension expenditure and labor 
productivity. Its results are presented in Figure 5, which also reports the current 
(1995) pension burden for comparison. 
In the baseline simulation, the pension burden grows in all countries, espe-
cially in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.  The increase is most 
notable in Italy, where a peak of 32.4 percent is reached in 2045.  In France the 
peak is  24  percent and is  reached in 2050,  in the Netherlands is  24.2  percent 
and is  reached in 2035,  in Germany is 24.1  percent and is reached in 2045, in 
the UK is  18.5 percent and is  reached in 2050,  in Spain is  21  percent and is 
reached in 2050. 
These  are very  high  numbers,  more  than twice  the current  values,  and 
lead additional support to the view that PAYG pension systems are inevitably 
doomed and that financial collapse can be averted only by a swift transition to 
a funded system. 
13 3  A  quantitative evaluation of the sources of long-
run imbalance 
\Vhat may happen in the next 30  to 50 years, should the ongoing trends con-
tinue while the current rules of public pension systems remain unaltered, has 
been documented in the previous section.  Our purpose now is to consider dif-
ferent scenarios and assess the quantitative impact they may have on the future 
pension burden. 
Our exercise is rooted on the following premise.  Unlike demographic trends, 
which can hardly be affected by policy, LFPRs, unemployment levels and labor 
productivity are all very sensitive to changes in policies,  fiscal  regimes,  labor 
market legislation and so on.  The empirical evidence  (see Blondal and Scar-
petta [1998] and Gruber and Wise [1998]  for recent assessments) also shows that 
a number provisions of curent PAYG systems tend to lower labor force partic-
ipation, facilitate early retirement, and reduce labor supply in general among 
citizens older than 50.  Such provisions are not linked to or determined by the 
PAYG nature of the pension systems.  They are, instead, more easily under-
standable as  aberrations, generated by political pressure and the rent-seeking 
behaviour of special interest groups. 
This is  crucial for  understanding the significance of the simulations that 
follow.  They are not meant to suggest that increasing LFPRs among certain 
groups or reducing unemployment to the level it was 20 years ago are easy pol-
icy tasks, or that we have a menu of well defined policies that would achieve just 
that.  There exists a  huge literature, both theoretical and applied, addressing 
this issue and suggesting specific structural policies that may help increasing 
LFPRs and reducing unemployment. It is not the task of this paper to evaluate 
such research effort  or to draw specific policy conclusions from it.  Our task 
is  to point out that it is  not the PAYG nature of the system that is  leading 
to its financial collapse, and that the demographic crisis, while serious, could 
be overcome if other factors were not concurring.  Such factors are the sharp 
reduction in LFPRs, the rise of unemployment, and the increase in the gen-
erosity of the system with older pensioners.  Such factors have been caused by 
policy choices other than the establishment of unfunded pension systems, and 
should not be confused with it.  Attenuating or eliminating them may require 
hard and controversial policy choices, but certainly it cannot be accomplished 
by replacing existing PAYG systems with funded systems. 
Besides, LFPRs and employment levels among women have been changing 
spontaneously in the last two decades, and are likely to continue along their up-
ward trend in the foreseeable future if appropriate conditions are maintained by 
well designed policies. The same is true, to a lesser extent, for the growth rate of 
14 labor productivity.  After two decades of relatively stagnant performances, labor 
productivity has picked up in the last decade and, again, its future behaviour 
may be enhanced by policies favoring innovation and labor .mobility. 
Last, but not least, we  must consider the extent to which a well  designed 
PA  YG system should treat old and new pensioners  "generously".  We  showed 
in Figure 4 that, in  most ED countries,  outstanding pensions have grown at 
roughly the same rate as average labor productivity for  the last 15-20 years. 
This is  a  remarkably generous policy when compared, for  example, to one of 
pure inflation indexation.  If the replacement rate (that is  the ratio between 
initial pension and the last earnings) were to be kept constant, we would expect 
new pensions to grow at the same rate as labor productivity.  Let us call this 
a  policy  of  constant  generosity,  with a  lower  case  "g".  European countries 
have instead adopted a policy of constant Generosity, with an upper case "G", 
according to which all pensions are increased at the same rate at which labor 
productivity grows.  This second kind of generosity is  less  obviously implied 
by the rules of a properly functioning, stationary PAYG system.  Instead, it is 
more likely to be the outcome of political pressure from well organized unions 
of elderly citizens.  It becomes  particularly destabilising when coupled with 
increases in life expectancy of the size experienced by the ED countries during 
the last 30-40 years.  Again, an unfunded system does not require old pensions 
to grow at the same rate as average labor productivity. 
Before deciding what is  causing what,  and what needs  to be fixed,  it is 
therefore worthwhile to clearly separate the impact of one policy choice from 
the other.  This is  the motivation for  the four sets of simulations that follow. 
They ask the following question:  Given current rules of the system and current 
demographic trends,  what would  happen if female  LFPRs converged to the 
ones already observed in the DK and the Scandinavian countries?  And what 
would happen if,  in addition, male employment rates were pushed back to the 
level of the early 1980s?  And what would happen if we  moved from  a  policy 
of "constant Generosity" to one of "constant generosity"? Finally, what would 
happen if these changes in policy and labor market conditions happened all 
together? 
3.1  Alternative scenarios 
We consider four  alternative scenarios.  They all share the same demographic 
trends and old-age dependency ratios of the baseline simulation described in 
Section 2.5 but differ as follows. 
1.  Increasing LFPRs and falling  unemployment rates.  This process is  as-
sumed to take place gradually and be fully completed by the end of our 
15 simulation horizon in year 2050.  Everything else follows  the same trends 
as in the baseline case.  Within this scenario, we distinguish two cases.  In 
the first  one (Simulation la), age-specific  male LFPRs stay constant at 
their current level, female LFPRs rates increase until reaching 80 percent 
of those of men, whereas age-specific male and female unemployment rates 
converge to a common value, equal to half the current level of male un-
employment rates.  In the second case (Simulation 1  b), age-specific male 
LFPRs and unemployment rates revert to their levels in the early 1980s, 
female LFPRs rates increase until reaching 80  percent of those of men, 
whereas female unemployment rates converge to the male ones. 
2.  A policy of constant generosity is enacted with labor productivity growing 
annually at either 1 percent (Simulation 2a) or 2 percent (Simulation 2b). 
Everything else follows the same trends as in the baseline case. 
3.  The changes of simulations 1. and 2. occur together, while all other param-
eters follow the same trends as in the baseline case.  Labor productivity 
grows at 2 percent per year and we distinguish between the two alternative 
labor market scenarios (Simulations 3a and 3b). 
4.  A policy of decreasing generosity is enacted, with the ratio between new 
pensions and labor productivity decreasing by one half of a  percentage 
point a  year, while labor productivity grows at 2 percent per year.  We 
distinguish between the two alternative labor market scenarios (Simula-
tions 4a and 4b). Everything else follows the same trends as in the baseline 
case. 
The assumptions that we  make about the behaviour of the female labor force 
are much less demanding than it may appear.  Indeed, countries such as Den-
mark, France, Germany and the UK have already reached female LFPRs equal 
or close to 80 percent of those of males, while other (such as Ireland) already 
show no gender differences in unemployment rates.  The reduction in unem-
ployment rates to half of their current values by 2020  is,  instead,  a  stronger 
assumption which may well be realized, but only under substantial changes in 
the functioning of the European goods and factor markets. 
3.2  Basic Findings 
Figure 6 reports the major findings for each of the eight simulations described 
above.  For simplicity,  we  only report EU averages obtained by weighting the 
available countries (Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden are excluded) by their 
16 share of the GDP.6 Each of the panels refers to one of the four basic simulations, 
and presents the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP, along with its current 
value (the unmarked horizontal line)  and its value in the b~eline case.  Define 
the "demographic burden" as the difference between the current pension expen-
ditures/GDP ratio and its value in the peak year.  We will be mainly concerned 
with the reductions in the demographic burden under each of the alternative 
scenarios. 
Under the first scenario, in which LFPRs increase and unemployment rates 
fall,  the reductions  of the demographic  burden with respect  to the baseline 
scenario vary between one  fourth  (if  only  female  LFPRs increease)  and one 
third  (if LFPRs increase  for  both men and women).  These  are substantial 
improvements over the baseline case.  Changes in labor market conditions of 
the kind we have assumed may help alleviate the fiscal burden of forthcoming 
pension payments. 
An obvious criticism to our exercise is the following:  that increasing LFPRs 
at time t is only a temporary palliative, as it implies an increase in the number 
of pensioners at time t + T,  where  T  is  the number of years it takes for  the 
additional workers  to retire.  This criticism is,  to a  certain extent,  correct, 
yet its quantitative impact is limited.  First of all,  certain increases of LFPRs 
do not imply an increase in the future number of pensioners but, instead,  a 
decrease in the internal rate of return of the pension system.  This is  the case 
for  increasing LFPRs among elderlies and, more generally, individuals who are 
already working during part of their lifes and receiving some pension after the 
age of 60.  Most countries have "minimum pension"  provisions, which generate 
very high rates of return for the social security contributions of individuals with 
very short working histories (for quantitative evaluations across countries, see 
the papers in Gruber and Wise  [1998]).  A  similar argument  applies to the 
possible effects of reduction in unemployment rates:  all unemployment spells 
lasting less than 2 or 3 years do not reduce perspective pensions as "figurative" 
contributions are  being paid by the Social Security Administration.  Hence, 
the only side along which the labor market scenarios we study are open to the 
previous criticism, would be that increasing female LFPRs.  But, even in this 
case,  a careful consideration of the actual institutional mechanisms currently 
in place,  suggests the practical impact may be rather limited.  The reason is 
simple:  non-working women live  longer  than men,  are typically married  to 
working men who draw a  pension and are often entitled to survival pensions 
after the death of the spouse.  Getting those women to work and contribute 
would, at least in part, reduce the internal rate of return for married men with 
6  Detailed tabulations by country are available from the authors upon request. 
17 long-living non-working wives.7  For each nation the peak burden is now lower 
than in the baseline case,  and substantially lower  for  countries, such as Italy 
and Spain, where the current level of female LFPRs is low or male LFPRs have 
fallen very sharply during the last 15 years. 
In the second simulation,  a  policy of "constant generosity"  (i. e.  the ratio 
between new pensions and average labor productivity is  kept constant at its 
current level, but old pensions are not increased with labor productivity) yields 
reductions of similar order of magnitude as in the first  scenario for  the same 
productivity growth (1  percent), or higher with higher productivity growth (2 
percent).  The typical  profile  in  most  countries sees  an initial  small  decline 
till about year 2005,  a subsequent increase until about year 2035,  and then a 
flattening or a mild decline.  When the changes envisaged by the two previous 
scenarios are enacted simultaneously, the demographic burden is reduced by at 
least half in all countries.  Further, most countries generate a "surplus" (relative 
to current expenditure levels) for the next 10-15 years. 
Finally, in the fourth scenario, under which a policy of slight reductions of 
generosity is  implemented, the demographic burden is  reduced by 30-40 per-
cent,  again generating large surpluses for  the next decade or so.  Moreover, 
simulations 1 and 4 together imply that most countries would be able to main-
tain their pension burden at or below its current (1995)  level for  the next 55 
years.8 
These findings provide support for our first two policy prescriptions:  before 
dismantling the existing PAYG systems, there are important and reasonable 
policy options available which may prevent financial disruption even in the face 
of the forthcoming demographic bomb.  Of course, our simulated results may 
be perfected.  Although based on fairly reasonable assumptions about demo-
graphics and labor productivity growth, they are "partial equilibrium results" 
by construction and make no attempt to evaluate the impact that increasing 
female LFPRs and decreasing unemployment levels may have on the growth of 
labor productivity and real wages.  Should the former bring about a substantial 
reduction in the latter, totallabor income may grow less than we are implicitly 
7  Because of the demographic projections that we are using, our simulation horizon ends in 
2050.  This does not allow us to take into account the effects, after year 2050, of the increased 
number of female retirees.  On the other hand, the effects before year 2050 are small, due to 
the extreme smoothness of the labor market changes we envisage. 
S  If we take the current pension burden as a  reference point, the "surpluses" obtainable 
during the next 10-15 years could be very helpful, when properly capitalised, to finance the 
deficits of the later periods.  As a matter of fact, a policy of this kind has been adopted in the 
USA a few years ago.  The current surpluses of the Social Security Administration are being 
kept, at least from an accounting point of view, in a Trust Fund which is to be used later on 
to mitigate the impact of baby boomers' retirement. An interesting debate is currently taking 
place as to the opportunity of investing a portion, or even all, the Trust Fund into equities as 
opposed to the government bonds in which they are currently kept. 
18 assuming here.  The reduction in the fiscal burden would then be substantially 
lower.  It is  hard to guess  which way  the effect  should go.  While  textbook 
assumptions about decreasing returns to scale suggest that_ average lab  or pro-
ductivity may decrease, the USA experience suggests the opposite.  Further, the 
intrinsically dynamic nature of the process of technological innovation and job 
creation, implies that a  more flexible  labor market, more efficient  search and 
matching procedures,  and a faster creation of jobs may increase,  rather than 
reduce, average labor productivity. 
4  Reconsidering the transition to a fully funded sys-
tem 
The analysis developed so far implies that EU governments should concentrate 
upon reducing unemployment and the growth rate of old pensions before start-
ing  to dismantle existing PAYG  systems.  Still,  our discussion  falls  short of 
proving that a  transition to a  fully  funded  system would  not be superior to 
even a reformed PAYG system and of providing a positive argument as to why 
a PAYG system should continue to exist altogether.  This is what we do in this 
and the following section. 
First,  we  argue that a  numerical  evaluation of a  feasible  transition to a 
fully funded system proves that all gains are accrued in the far future and all 
costs are paid up-front.  This makes the transition politically untenable, and 
calls for  an intergenerational debt arrangement to sustain it.  Second, we recall 
an argument due originally to Robert Merton according to which an optimal 
portfolio should contain, among other, assets with payoffs  determined by the 
return on both physical and human capital.  Empirical evidence from  the EU 
countries strongly supports this view, which is coherent with a stochastic version 
of the simple growth model we outline in the following section. 
About transition, let us begin by dispensing with the idea that a  "small 
tax now"  coupled with the magic of financial markets is an easy and safe way 
to avoid the "big tax later".  This seems,  as far  as we  can tell, the backbone 
of the recent suggestion (Feldstein [1999])  to reform the USA social security 
system by introducing immediately an additional, 2.3 percent, wage tax, with 
proceedings to be invested in stocks and bonds.  Assuming the chosen portfolio 
yields an average net return, over the next 30 to 50 years, equal to 5.5 percent, 
the capitalized value of the tax flow  would be enough to cover the additional 
pension payments the American Social Security Administration is expected to 
face after 2030.  This allows maintaining the payroll social security contributions 
at its current level (12.4 percent) instead of going to the 17.8 percent or higher 
level that is commonly forecasted. 
19 We fail to see in what sense such reform would engender some kind of welfare 
improvement.  Current taxation would move to 14.7 percent, instead of staying 
at 12.4.  It is  reasonable to ask:  what is  the discount rate at which the pain of 
an additional 2.3 percent tax now is equal to that of an additional 5.6 percent 
tax in 2030?  The answer,  obviously,  is:  5.5  percent.  But then,  if this is  the 
return one can safely earn in the financial markets, why not announcing that 
the Payroll Social Security tax will  be kept at 12.4 percent forever  and that 
pension payments will have to balance the budget? Done this, the Government 
can safely leave in the workers' pocket the 2.3 percent of their wages it would 
have to take otherwise.  Workers will  be free  to save  and invest  that money 
as  their risk/return preferences recommend.  Certainly, this cannot be Pareto 
inferior to an additional distorting tax paired with a Federal official in charge 
of portfolio allocation decisions. 
There is another, dubious, side to the proposal: the risk burden it involves. 
This is  considered,  with great care and precision,  in the paper by Miles  and 
Timmermann [1999], to which we refer for  more details. 
Moving on to a different set of issues, we should look at the aggregate and 
redistributional implication of a transition.  Actual proposals on the table, dif-
fer  as to the extent to which private savings invested in the financial markets 
should account for future pension payments, and as to the timing and modes 
of the introduction of such a  "fully funded"  system.  Contrasting opinions also 
exist with regard to the mandatory or voluntary nature of the private saving 
which should flow  into the private or public pension funds.  Deciding if fully 
funded systems should replace (in part or completely) the current PAYG sys-
tems or should instead just grow spontaneously on their side, is not a secondary 
matter.  Let us call the first  approach the "replacement", and the second one 
the "parallel".  Our claim is  that, in order to be effective, both approaches in-
volve a sharp reduction in the pensions of those who are currently retired or are 
going to retire over the next two or three decades.  This raises a serious issue 
of intergenerational redistribution which ought to be addressed if we  hope to 
make any transition to a fully funded system, even a partial one, economically 
and politically viable. 
If the parallel approach is taken, one needs to explain where the additional 
resources to be invested in professional or individual pension plans should be 
found.  Short of engineering  (by which  means?)  an increase  in  the private 
propensity to save out of permanent income, it is  hard to see how such extra 
saving may come around. If the aggregate fiscal pressure is to be kept constant 
and, in particular, if social security contributions cannot be drastically reduced, 
total disposable income of current workers is not going to increase by an act of 
magic. It  is easy to see that the "fiscal incentives" refrain one often encounters in 
20 many policy papers is, indeed, only a refrain.  Consider, to be a bit more specific, 
the case of the EU countries.  If public spending (inclusive of public pension 
payments) remains constant and additional budget deficits. are not allowed, in 
keeping with the Stability Pact required by the Monetary Union, providing fiscal 
incentives  to certain kinds  of financial  instruments will  require  adding fiscal 
pressure somewhere else,  thereby keeping average disposable income constant, 
net of redistributional effects between its different sources.  It is  very hard to 
believe that,  by simply reshuffling  fiscal  pressure among income groups,  one 
may engineer  a  substantial increase in the aggregate saving rate.  Moreover, 
should the fiscal incentives achieve their purpose, the additional private saving 
flowing to the pension funds will most likely come at the expense of a reduction 
in other kinds of private saving.  On average, this is unlikely to generate higher 
aggregate saving and it may even reduce fiscal  revenues.  Hence a substantial 
reduction of social security pensions, to increase the private disposable income 
of the generations that are still working and saving, is an implicit ingredient of 
a feasible transition process. 
Alternatively, if the "replacement" option is adopted, it implies using legal 
coercion to divert, toward saving and investment, resources that are currently 
taxed to finance  pensions payments.  This leaves  unanswered the question of 
which other resources should be used to pay for pensions in the meanwhile or if, 
again, a reduction in per-capita pensions should be phased in over the next two 
decades or so.  References to the Chilean or other Latin American experiences 
are,  in this debate,  quite misleading.  Common to all  those experiences was 
a particular combination of the following elements, which are altogether miss-
ing in the EU countries:  (a) existing unfunded pensions were set at relatively 
low levels;  (b) it was politically and economically possible to run large budget 
surpluses for  a  number of consecutive years;  (c)  it was  politically feasible  to 
implement a drastic reduction in the absolute income level of the pensioners; 
(d)  the demographic structure of the population was the opposite of the EU: 
many young  and few  old people.  Also  the replacement  approach,  therefore, 
implies a drastic redistributional choice, either between generations or between 
social groups or both at the same time. 
That the transition is, fundamentally, an issue of intergenerational redistri-
bution was pointed out by Breyer [1989]  and other authors quite a while ago. 
The point is simple and intuitive.  Let (1 +  g)  be the earnings growth factor and 
(1 +r) the rate ofreturn on capital, with r > g.  If  the currently old are expected 
to receive p under the PAYG plan, switching to capitalization, without making 
some generation worse,  off implies paying them p  by issuing public debt.  By 
doing this, the working generation avoid taxation and is  allowed to invest the 
same amount p in the financial markets, providing for  its retirement.  Instead 
21 of receiving p(! + g) when old the generation that is  working and saving at the 
time of transition will  receive p(! + r'),  which  is  larger.  But, and here is  the 
trick, somebody must bear the burden of the accumulated  public debt, which 
has a value exactly identical to p(! + r). If  this is charged to the new working 
generation, they are worse off.  They would end up paying p(l + r)  > p(l +  g), 
the latter being their social security contribution under the old PAYG system. 
Hence a portion at least as large as (r - g)p must be born by the currently old, 
which were supposed to be benefitted by the transition. It is  easy to see that, 
once the debt is taken care of, also this generation is indifferent between PAYG 
and capitalization. The argument can be iterated as many times as one pleases, 
leaving every generation neither worse nor better off than under PAYG. There 
is no free lunch, indeed. 
Further, to the extent that both rand 9 are random variables and that, as 
everybody knows,  O'r > O'g  (i.e.  returns on capital are more volatile, even over 
long periods of time, than GDP growth rates)our citizens are worse off.  After 
the transition they are  bearing more risk  while  receiving the same expected 
return.  No exercise in financial engineering, like the "Government issued put 
options"  proposed, e.g.  by Modigliani et al.  [1999],  can obliterate this simple 
fact.  The new lunch is,  indeed, quite expensive. 
Last, but not the least, is  the issue of "which generation is  going to gain" 
from  the transition?  This topic has not been investigated enough in the lit-
erature and it certainly deserves additional and important attention.  To the 
best of our knowledge only Miles [1998]  and Miles and Iben [1998], have tried to 
provide a quantitative answer to this question, by modelling explicitly the tran-
sition path and its differential impact upon various generations.  The answer 
is  unequivocal:  under wide ranges of realistic parameter values,  a  transition 
from an unfunded to a funded pension system entails a drastic reduction in the 
consumption levels of the generations that are currently alive, be them retired, 
working or even just born.  The gains from transition would begin to flow only 
to individuals that are (Miles and Iben [1998], Tables 7 and 8) at least 10 to 20 
years from being born at the date the transition starts.  Most of the gains are 
expected to flow  to individuals that are born between half and a  full  century 
after the transition was initiated. 
Even taking for granted the efficiency gains obtainable at the new steady 
state (which,  as already argued, are not there), it is  unclear why the current 
generations should even consider the hypothesis of undertaking such a  tran-
sition.  As a  matter of fact,  simple political economy considerations suggest 
that, at least in this respect, the demographic bomb does matter.  The age of 
the median voter that, in most European countries, is now between 42  and 45 
will  grow steadily toward 50+ in the next few  decades.  We  cannot envisage 
22 reasonable institutional reforms that may lower  its age.  Therefore, we  believe 
the redistributional implications of a full transition makes it politically unfeasi-
ble.  For once, the median voters' preferences may get us closer to the efficient 
allocation than otherwise. 
In our view there is only one approach to the problem which may make the 
(partial) transition to a fully funded system both economically and politically 
attractive. It amounts to financing most of the pension payments to be incurred 
during the transition phase by issuing new public debt. The cost of servicing and 
redeeming such debt should be shared equally by all the generations benefitting 
from  the reform.  Holzmann [1997]  contains some preliminary estimates of the 
quantities involved here.  Much more empirical and theoretical work is needed 
before we  can feel  comfortable with these assessments.  Such research work is 
most  welcome  because,  as we  argue in the conclusions,  some  version of this 
approach is  probably the only way to implement a successful version of what 
we have called the "consensus view" . 
One may argue that those raised so far are purely redistributional issues and 
that, as such, they should be dealt with by politicians.  On purely normative 
grounds, and abstracting from transition costs, a fully funded system still stands 
superior to a PAYG  one.  While we  disagree with the naive view that leaves 
redistributional issues to politicians to meddle with, the substantive claim of 
the next section is that even on purely normative grounds a fully funded pension 
system is not to be recommended.  We now turn to justify this claim. 
5  Issues in the design of an optimal pension system 
The intuition behind the claimed Pareto superiority of a fully funded system is 
based upon the following two facts.  b(a) Unfunded systems are financed via a 
tax on labor income, which inevitably distorts labor supply.  Funded systems, 
instead, are based upon voluntary private saving which involves no distortions in 
the allocation of resources.  (b) Within the context of an overlapping generation 
model of capital accumulation, unfunded systems can be modelled (see Diamond 
[1977])  as an income transfer from the young generation to the old one.  In such 
framework, a transfer from the young to the old is beneficial only if the growth 
rate of the total wage bill were higher than the rate of return on capital. When 
this is not true (as it seems to have been the case for the EU countries during 
the last 20  years)  the transfer involved with PAYG  pensions may lead to an 
inefficient intertemporal allocation of resources.  Claim (a) cannot be disputed: 
non-lump sum taxes, in general, distort allocations.  Hence social security taxes, 
to the extent they are not lump-sum, are a source of distortions in the labor 
market.  Reliable estimates of the size of such distortions are not available, but 
23 a rough comparison between the USA and the EU suggests they may be non-
negligible.  Hence, in particular, policies aimed at fostering labor demand in the 
EU countries may entail a reduction in social security contributions, paralleled, 
for  example, by the adoption of a policy of "flow generosity", such as the one 
we  described in Section 3 or a shifting of taxation to sources other than labor 
income. 
The practical relevance of claim (a), though, should be assessed in relation 
to the actual form in which fully funded pension plans have been or are being 
introduced. In the theoretical models, fully funded pension plans are equivalent 
to private savings of the working generation being invested in productive capital 
stock and earning the appropriate return. If this were the case in practice, the 
only policy needed to support a fully funded system would be a  reduction of 
social security contributions or, better, of the total fiscal pressure upon private 
sector's income.  This would increase private disposable income and generate 
the additional savings to be invested in the mutual funds.  In practice, pension 
funds have been and still are the objects of a host of fiscal and legal incentives 
that are hardly justifiable on the grounds of economic efficiency.  Hence it is not 
obvious that, in practice, the efficiency gains we  can achieve by reducing the 
distorting social security tax would not be wiped out by the efficiency losses 
induced by the new fiscal  incentives to investing in pension funds. 
As  for  point (b), it is correct  only in a world in which physical capital9  is 
the only reproducible factor of production and the only channel through which 
individuals can transfer income from the present to the future.  The claim, in 
particular, is not correct whenever there exists a second productive asset, call it 
human capital, which may be accumulated over time, which contributes to fu-
ture production but whose rights of ownership cannot be traded in the financial 
markets or, more generally, cannot be freely transferred from one individual to 
another.  In such circumstances the optimal allocation of resources over time 
requires that the accumulation of both productive assets be financed  in the 
appropriate proportion.  Accumulation should occur up to the point at which, 
controlling for differential risks, the different investments yield the same rate of 
return. 
Fully funded  systems,  relying upon the existence of properly functioning 
capital markets, are generally assumed to be economically efficient.  As argued 
in the previous subsection, their weaknesses are generally attributed either to 
unwarranted fiscal advantages or to the intra- and inter-generational inequalities 
they may bring about.  We believe this statement is  incorrect.  Do not misun-
derstand us:  we  are not going to claim that, under general circumstances, a 
9  Or, more generally, whatever productive assets financial markets instruments are claims 
to. 
24 PAYG system is  Pareto superior to a fully funded one.  We  content ourselves 
with less:  fully funded pension plans are not strictly superior to unfunded ones, 
both as a matter of theory and of facts.  Neither strictly dominates the other. 
A well-designed  public pension system should adopt both funding  strategies. 
The latter statement is  not meant to be vacuous,  that is,  the claim that an 
unfunded system is socially valuable does not refer to a very scaled down, min-
imum income maintenance unfunded plan as  in many "three pillar" proposals 
currently circulated. 
5.1  Is there a  reason to keep an unfunded pension system? 
Markets in which credit can be  obtained to finance  investment in individual 
human capital are not frequent.  Indeed, there are well  understood reasons for 
which such markets are difficult to set up and sustain over time. It is also well 
understood that, in the absence of such borrowing-lending opportunities, the 
competitive equilibrium cannot bring about an efficient allocation of resources, 
either static or dynamic. 
To fix  ideas, consider a world in which people live for three periods.  When 
they are young, they attend school, receive an education and prepare for  work. 
When middle aged, they sell their accumulated human capital on the market, 
earn a wage, consume and save for retirement.  When old, they consume inter-
ests and principal from their savings.  In each period of time a new generation 
is  born, so that three different generations are alive in each period. 
Assume also that both human and physical capital are useful in the produc-
tion of aggregate output. So, both engineers and machines are needed to carry 
out production.  Better engineers will operate machines more efficiently,  while 
more machines will  make the engineers more productive.  In such a  context 
a social planner would like to accumulate both kinds of capital.  Assume the 
young have no resources to invest in their own education, and that parents are 
too selfish to provide privately with the adequate amount. 
One may suspect that the last, somewhat unrealistic, assumption will drive 
our conclusions.  This is  not so.  Parental altruism,  as  long  as  it  does  not 
fully internalise the welfare of all future generations, would only attenuate but 
not eliminate the inefficiency we  mentioned.  In particular, parental altruism 
by itself cannot, in general, provide the right amount of investment in human 
capital.  This is  because parents, even when they care for  the consumption or 
the human capital level of their progenies, cannot internalize the impact upon 
physical capital's productivity of an increase in the aggregate stock of human 
capital. 
Now assume there exists a complete set of financial markets in this economy, 
25 by which  we  mean that whoever desires to save or borrow can do so,  at the 
market  interest  rate,  provided  it  respects  a  lifetime  budget  constraint:  one 
cannot  borrow more  than one can pay back.  In these circumstances life  is 
simple:  the young borrow from the middle age to finance their education.  The 
middle age,  who  are saving, lend to the young up to the point at which  the 
return from  this  kind of investment  (accumulation of future  human capital, 
H)  is  equal to the return from  the other available investment  (accumulation 
of physical capital, K).  Hence both Hand K  are accumulated in the proper 
amounts, and our miniature economy displays persistent growth and both static 
and dynamic efficiency. 
When markets are not complete, economic growth is reduced or eliminated 
altogether and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient.  Clearly one may assume 
that both kinds of capital markets are absent to that neither H  nor K  can 
be accumulated.  But, in reality, there exist abundant financial instruments to 
accumulate K  and very few  if any to accumulate H, especially basic H  (the 
one received in most countries before the age of 18).  Hence it is reasonable to 
assume that, absent some form of collective action, accumulation of H  would 
be drastically reduced. 
Such an outcome may be overcome if the members of  subsequent generations 
are capable of implementing a repeated sequence of intergenerational transfers. 
Consider the following  scheme.  In each period t  two  taxes are levied  upon 
the middle age generation, to provide resources for two simultaneous transfers. 
The proceedings from the first tax are used to payout a pension (net of income 
taxes)  to the elderly.  For the sake of simplicity,  assume  a  period-by-period 
balanced budget, hence 
(4.1) 
where the first symbol denotes the tax and the second the transfer.  The pro-
ceedings from the second tax are used to finance investment in the education 
of the young generation.  Balanced budget, again, implies 
(4.2) 
The budget constraint for the representative member of a generation born in 
period t - 1 is, period by period 
O:S  Investment in education  :S Et-I 
Consumption + Saving  :S  Income  - Ti - Tt
e 
Consumption  <  Return on Savings +  PHI 
(4.3) 
The structure of the scheme is simple.  At each point in time the working age 
citizens pay back their debt to the elderly, who financed their human capital ac-
cumulation during the previous period. Simultaneously they also diversify their 
26 investment portfolio by financing both the accumulation of physical (Savings) 
and of human capital (Et).  Could this mechanism reach the efficient outcome? 
Certainly. 
5.2  The optimal system of intergenerational transfers 
Let d;,  denote the amount that a young would invest in personal education in 
the complete market model of the previous subsection.  Equation (4.3)  shows 
that, if the amounts (Tf, Pt, Tte, Et)  are chosen appropriately, they can satisfy 
(  4.4) 
where r; is the market rate of return. 
Only this arrangement can restore efficiency and improve long-run growth. 
Without the explicit linkage, stressed in (4.4), between the financing of public 
education and the payment of PAYG pensions, equilibria in this economy are 
not efficient.  In particular, retirement pensions financed by the investment in 
K  only cannot achieve efficiency.  Which is the first  point we  wanted to make: 
fully funded pension systems alone do not deliver the efficient allocation. 
Secondly,  we  should  also  stress that a  system of public school  financing 
alone, without connections to the PAYG pensions, cannot achieve intertempo-
ral efficiency either.  The ensuing wealth effects on the middle age generation 
would move consumption and saving away from the dynamically efficient lev-
els.  The same "partial" system also suffers of the obvious problem of not being 
individually rational: each middle age generation would find it attractive to dis-
mantle public education when its turn of financing it arrives.  Only the explicit 
intergenerational linkage ("You will not get your pension if you do not finance 
the education of the young generation") guarantees that the correct allocation 
is sustained over timelO. 
The scheme we  are proposing here is also intergenerationally "fair", in the 
sense that it provides each generation with a  market driven return from  its 
investment in human capital.  In the applied literature on PAYG Social Secu-
rity systems the issue of "actuarial fairness"  between contributions paid and 
pensions received is  hotly debated.  Our model suggests that one should test 
actuarial fairness by comparing, on the one hand, the contributions paid with 
the amount of public education received and, on the other hand, taxes devoted 
to public education with pension payments. 
The final  point to be addressed concerns the implement  ability of such a 
scheme in the current European context and the difference between the essen-
tially lump-sum taxes considered in our model and actual (linear or non-linear) 
10  For further discussion and technical details, see Boldrin and Montes [1998]. 
27 taxes.  Implementability hinges,  in our view,  on the extent to which the pro-
posed system would modify or not the intergenerational transfer flows that are 
already taking place  through the public education and the pension systems. 
A  proper answer  requires extensive and detailed  micro  economic data analy-
sis to be carried out country by country.  Such study has been performed for 
Spain.l1  It is  found there that only relatively minor adjustments should take 
place, at least for  the average citizen.  That is:  the flow  of taxes and benefits 
paid or received by the average (Spanish) citizen during its lifetime would not 
be drastically changed.  Taking current levels of Spanish investment in public 
education as given, a reduction of between 2 and 9 percent in the average pen-
sion would be the most important change required to satisfy the requirements 
of our normative model. 
This is,  though, only the macroeconomic side of the problem.  On the mi-
croeconomic side things are more complicated and, potentially, more interesting. 
The rules according to which taxes and transfers are determined would have 
to change, and change substantially, under the system we  are proposing here. 
Notice, that the education subsidy is de-facto a lump-sum transfer already in 
most European countries.  This is true, at least, for  the portion involved with 
mandatory schooling.  The portion relative to higher education is not delivered 
lump-sum. It is  not obvious, at least to us,  that public financing of higher ed-
ucation should indeed be maintained. If  somebody argues it should, it must be 
because the social benefits from such provision overcomes the social costs and 
the distortions induced by the transfer. If  this is the case, the superposition of 
our scheme would not change the results. 
One should recognise next that if the educational transfer is lump-sum, then 
also the social security tax is lump-sum:  at the beginning of his or her working 
life  each citizen faces  a  fixed  amount of debt, proportional to the amount of 
public education received.  In practice, it would not be hard to allow individual 
citizens a certain degree of flexibility about how such debt could be paid back. 
One may then select to pay it upfront or be charged a fixed labor income tax 
for a certain number of periods. 
Income and other taxes to finance  education are certainly not lump-sum 
and they can hardly be made so.  The practical point is,  though,  that they 
already exist in all EU countries.  Given this fact,  our scheme would not add 
any additional distortion to those already in place.  Earmarking simply makes 
explicit the destination of a certain portion of total tax revenues.  By linking 
some taxes to future pension payments and treating them as  an investment 
it creates, if anything, an incentive for the citizen-voter to guarantee that re-
11  See Boldrin and Montes [1998],  and, for the complete details, Montes [1998]. 
28 sources keep flowing into public education and the investment in human capital. 
Admittedly, if such "investment" becomes subsidized and offers an abnormally 
high rate of return this would be an inefficient outcome.  ~he latter seems, at 
least to us, the most serious potential weakness of the proposed scheme.  While 
not a trivial issue, one may think of a variety of checks and balances that can 
be built into the system to reduce the likelihood of such an outcome. 
5.3  The case of uncertain returns, once again 
In our model we treat returns on either physical or human capital investments 
as  completely deterministic.  In the real world,  those rates of return are quite 
uncertain.  Table 7 reports historical averages for  each country, while Table 8 
presents the estimated variance-covariance matrix.  We  have not reported ex-
plicit computations of private returns on human capital investments, as we have 
been unable to find comparable estimates for the set of EU countries. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that labor earnings represent the gross returns from human 
capital, their mean growth rate and standard deviations are a very reasonable 
proxy for  the unmeasured mean return on human capital investment and its 
standard deviation. 
The reported figures confirm that the return on physical capital is uncertain 
and risky,  and that the rate of growth of real wages is  also uncertain but less 
risky (that is,  less volatile)  than the former.  Expected rates of return are, as 
expected,  higher for  physical than for  human capital, but both their relative 
volatility and covariance structure suggest that neither one dominates the other, 
at least in a mean-variance sense. 
Let us go  back to our simple model and add some uncertainty to the rates 
of return from both kinds of investments assuming, as the data show, that the 
stochastic processes for  the two returns are negatively correlated.  Would this 
change the policy recommendation?  Indeed no,  it would reinforce it.  Diver-
sification of risk provides an additional reason to invest  in both human and 
physical capital.  This argument, as mentioned in the Introduction, goes back 
to Robert Merton (see e.g. Merton [1983]). 
Hence, a second normative reason for  keeping some form of PAYG pension 
system.  Returns on investments are uncertain,  the direction of technological 
progress cannot be predicted decades ahead, rates of return on the stock market 
need not dominate forever the growth rate of human capital income.  Investment 
in  the latter is  hard to finance  via private credit markets and returns from 
human capital investment are even harder to securitize. 
It is  important to note that,  also here,  financial  engineering alone would 
not do.  While the idea of issuing bonds or derivative securities whose return is, 
29 positively, linked to the growth of labor earnings can help diversify individual 
portfolio, this cannot be true for the aggregate one, unless some external, very 
large indeed, investor is willing to bear the risk.  Eventually) the market porto-
folio  can be diversified only if there exist securities which finance investments 
in human capital and which, therefore, are direct claims to a portion of future 
labor earnings.  A PAYG pension system in which returns are linked to previous 
investments in human capital, constitutes exactly such a  "security". 
6  Conclusion and policy recommendations 
In this article we have argued the following.  The public unfunded pension plans 
which are currently in place in most European countries are doomed, rebus sic 
stantibus, to become fisc ally,  and therefore politically, untenable in about 15 to 
25 years time. According to our calculations, this fate is determined by a num-
ber of concurrent factors:  (a) demographic trends, which are rapidly increasing 
the ratio between the elderly and the rest of the population; (b) rapid decreade 
in the labor force participation of men, slow increase in the participation rate of 
women and persistently high unemployment rates across demographic groups; 
(c) a policy that increases the real value of outstanding pensions by transferring 
to all pensioners, new and old alike, any increase in average labor productivity; 
(d)  a  policy of increasing incentives to early retirement for  individuals  aged 
55+. 
Only (a) is a truly exogenous phenomenon, scarcely modifiable by policy, at 
least in the medium run.  All other factors are the direct outcome of political 
choices.  While these choices  may be  based upon perfectly legitimate social 
concerns, they are generally unrelated to the purposes and functioning of PAYG 
pension systems. It takes indeed little to recognise the redistributional nature of 
factors (b) to (d), the identity and composition of the rent-seeking groups that 
have been beneficiaries of such redistribution, as well  as  the specific political 
episodes that, country by country, have motivated or justified their adoption. 
By means of well-calibrated numerical simulations we have shown that, by 
reversing those ill-fated political choices, the destiny of existing unfunded public 
pension schemes may also be turned around.  More precisely,  we  have shown 
the following.  Under the assumption that lab  or productivity will grow at an 
annual average of 2 percent for the next 55 years, there exists a set of conditions 
sufficient to maintain the ratio between Old-age pension payments and GDP 
at worst equal to its current level  and in fact  below it, for  most of the years 
between now and 2050.  Those conditions are: 
I  From its current level,  reduce the ratio between new pensions and labor 
30 productivity of half a  percentage point a  year.  Keep constant the real 
value of old pensions. 
II  Between now and 2050,  bring LFPRs of males back to where they were 
in the early 1980s. 
III Raise female LFPRs at around 80  percent that of males by 2050. 
IV  Reduce unemployment rates for  men to about half their current level and 
equate female and male unemployment rate by year 2050. 
Secondly,  we  have argued that proponents of fisc ally supported transitions 
to fully funded pension systems have failed to consider or properly address the 
following set of controversial issues. 
V  Fiscal incentives to private, or employment related, pension funds would 
come at the cost of increasing taxation somewhere else, at least as long as 
public expenditure is not drastically reduced and the Stability and Growth 
Pact is  in force  among EU15  countries.  To  the extent that disposable 
income remains the same it is  unclear from  where the additional saving 
should come.  Hence the transition to a fully funded system requires either 
a drastic reduction in pension payments to the currently retired or the 
issuance of earmarked debt and the corresponding relaxation of the debt 
ceilings established by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
VI  Even under the assumption that the growth rate of labor productivity 
will remain substantially below the rate of return on capital for the indef-
inite future, a transition from PAYG to fully funded cannot be beneficial 
to everybody.  It must,  inevitably,  imply some loss  for  the generations 
currently alive.  Unfortunately, careful analysis shows that the benefits 
will accrue only to generations that are not yet born.  This casts serious 
doubts upon the political feasibility of such a reform. 
Thirdly, we have claimed that, at least in principle but also as a matter of 
practical historical circumstances, the following  normative statements should 
be taken into account when planning a reform of public pension systems. 
VII  A PAYG system (of a smaller size than current ones) is a necessary tool 
for achieving intergenerational efficiency and fairness and to sustain long-
run growth.  This is true at least as long as we  do not find means better 
than public expenditure for financing the accumulation of human capital. 
VIII A PAYG system is  also a necessary instrument to achieve socially bene-
ficial portofolio diversification. 
31 IX  The internal rate of return of an efficient PAYG pension system should 
not be determined by the growth rate of GDP but, instead, by the rate 
of return on human capital investments. 
X  The optimal relative size of the two systems (PAYG and funded) as well 
as the generosity of the PAYG  one,  can be calculated by means of ob-
jective evidence and well  understood economic theory.  Historical data 
about rates of return and their variance-covariance structure can be used, 
together with optimal portfolio theory, to solve this problem. 
Finally,  the historical experience of unfunded pension schemes in Europe 
reminds us of the wisdom of distinguishing "market completing"  from  "red  is-
tributive" policies.  PAYG pension plans are public institutions aimed at allevi-
ating inefficiencies generated by the lack of certain financial markets.  Their use 
as camouflaged redistributional devices, motivated by rent-seeking and political 
purposes, has turned into an abuse and, in about three decades, almost lead to 
their financial bankruptcy. 
We  insist on the fact that, in the justifiable and commendable process of 
getting rid of such redistributional distortions, one does not want to  "throw 
away the baby with the dirty water".  PAYG public pension systems do serve a 
useful purpose, which should be salvaged and enhanced by a deeper reform of 
the European Welfare State. 
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35 Table 1:  Social protection expenditures in the EU, 1995 
SPE  SPE  SPE p.c.  GDP p.c.  Pension Expenditures 
%GDP  %GE  PPS '000  PPS '000  %SPE  %GDP 
Austria  29.7  55.2  5.7  19.2  46.7  13.9 
Belgium  29.7  52.9  5.6  18.9  39.8  11.8 
Denmark  34.3  55.2  6.3  19.8  36.6  12.6 
Finland  33.8  54.7  5.0  16.8  31.8  10.4 
France  30.6  55.1  5.5  18.6  40.7  12.5 
Germany  30.4  53.5  5.8  20.3  40.8  12.0 
Greece  21.0  44.7  2.3  11.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Ireland  19.9  40.1  3.2  16.0  24.9  5.0 
Italy  24.6  43.6  4.1  18.1  62.7  15.4 
Luxembourg  25.3  57.9  7.7  29.0  43.2  10.9 
Netherlands  31.6  56.1  5.8  18.5  35.5  11.2 
Portugal  20.7  42.3  2.4  12.1  38.6  8.0 
Spain  21.8  49.7  2.9  13.2  44.1  9.6 
Sweden  35.6  48.9  6.1  17.8  36.6  13.0 
UK  28.5  57.4  4.5  17.3  38.0  10.4 
EU  28.4  52.2  4.8  17.4  42.4  12.1 
Notes: SPE: Social Protection Expenditures.  GE: Government Expenditures.  Pensions 
include expenditures classified under the Old-age and Survivors functions. 
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"I Table 2:  Demographic indicators for  the EU 
(1) 
Austria  2.7 
Belgium  2.6 
Denmark  2.5 
Finland  2.7 
France  2.7 
Germany  2.4 
Greece  2.3 
Ireland  3.8 
Italy  2.4 
Luxembourg  2.3 
Netherlands  3.1 
Portugal  3.1 
Spain  2.9 
Sweden  2.2 
UK  2.7 
EU  2.6 
(1)  Fertility rates in 1960. 
(2)  Fertility rates, difference 1995-60. 
(3)  Life expectancy at birth in 1960. 
(2)  (3) 
-1.3  69.5 
-1.0  70.6 
-0.7  72.4 
-0.9  69.1 
-1.1  70.3 
-1.1  72.3 
-0.9  69.9 
-1.9  70.0 
-1.2  69.8 
-0.6  69.4 
-1.6  73.4 
-1.7  64.0 
-1.6  69.8 
-0.3  73.0 
-1.0  70.8 
-1.1  70.1 


















(5)  Male residual life expectancy at age 60 in 1995. 
(6)  Female residual life expectancy at age 60 in 1995. 
Source: Eurostat (1996). 
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(5)  (6) 
18.6  22.8 
18.5  23.3 
17.8  21.6 
18.2  22.8 
19.7  25.0 
18.2  22.5 
19.9  22.8 
17.4  21.4 
19.0  23.9 
18.5  23.9 
18.5  23.2 
18.0  22.1 
19.4  23.9 
19.9  24.0 
18.3  22.3 
18.5  23.0 Table 3:  Dependency ratios (projections to years 2020 and 2050) 
Youth (0-19)  Elderly (60+)  Total 
1995  2020  2050  1995  2020  2050  1995  2020  2050 
Austria  40.9  36.6  39.5  34.7  46.2  67.3  75.6  82.8  106.7 
Belgium  44.1  42.2  44.2  39.0  54.0  66.4  83.1  96.3  110.6 
Denmark  41.7  42.0  43.4  35.2  48.8  57.5  76.9  90.8  100.9 
Finland  45.9  43.9  43.9  34.0  57.2  64.8  79.8  101.1  108.7 
France  48.6  44.4  44.8  37.1  52.9  70.8  85.7  97.3  115.7 
Germany  37.3  35.3  37.5  35.8  52.0  64.0  73.1  87.3  101.5 
Greece  45.2  41.9  43.0  39.8  51.8  71.4  85.0  93.7  114.4 
Ireland  66.8  48.6  47.6  30.1  50.0  104.6  96.9  98.6  152.2 
Italy  38.2  35.8  37.7  39.5  56.2  81.5  77.7  92.0  119.2 
Luxembourg  41.6  41.7  43.7  33.5  46.6  58.1  75.2  88.3  101.8 
Netherlands  42.1  41.8  44.0  30.5  49.6  62.3  72.6  91.4  106.2 
Portugal  48.4  41.7  42.8  36.7  44.5  65.5  85.1  86.2  108.3 
Spain  46.0  37.4  38.9  37.9  48.2  82.5  83.9  85.6  121.4 
Sweden  46.3  45.1  45.9  41.4  52.7  59.1  87.7  97.7  104.9 
DK  46.7  41.3  43.4  37.8  48.4  66.7  84.5  89.7  110.1 
DE  43.1  39.4  41.2  37.1  51.4  71.8  80.2  90.8  113.0 
Source:  Eurostat (1996). 
38 Table 4:  Participation rates by age and sex in the EU, 1980 and 1995. 
Aged 15-24  Aged 25-54  Aged 55--64 
Men  I  Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Men  I Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Men  I  Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Austria  n.a.  64.6  n.a.  58.9  n.a.  93.2  n.a.  73.3  n.a.  42.6  n.a.  18.8 
Belgium  46.0  36.0  41.8  31.7  94.4  92.3  54.1  68.2  50.6  35.9  12.3  13.3 
Denmark  68.3  77.0  62.3  69.4  94.2  91.8  84.4  82.1  67.2  67.9  42.1  40.1 
Finland  63.9  51.1  52.8  39.3  92.3  88.3  81.2  85.1  56.3  41.6  41.3  42.9 
France  52.5  32.8  44.2  26.7  96.3  94.9  63.0  77.3  69.9  41.5  39.0  30.9 
Germany  62.7  57.0  57.2  50.1  94.9  93.1  55.4  73.3  66.9  54.1  28.4  31.1 
Greece  50.2  41.3  36.4  32.5  95.3  94.5  44.1  55.0  71.2  61.1  26.2  24.5 
Ireland  68.9  49.0  54.2  42.0  95.0  90.6  27.6  54.6  77.9  63.9  20.1  21.2 
Italy  48.7  43.8  39.9  33.8  93.3  89.5  38.9  53.7  56.2  44.1  10.5  13.8 
Luxembourg  63.2  42.8  58.1  40.0  95.3  93.9  41.1  52.7  38.1  35.1  15.2  13.3 
Netherlands  49.2  62.2  46.3  61.8  93.0  92.6  34.0  65.7  65.3  41.4  14.4  18.6 
Portugal  78.3  47.2  63.7  38.9  95.0  93.6  54.8  74.1  75.6  61.9  32.4  34.5 
Spain  70.8  47.7  49.4  42.4  95.6  92.5  30.2  55.1  77.6  54.9  21.9  19.9 
Sweden  71.8  50.1  69.7  49.9  95.3  90.6  81.1  86.2  79.2  70.4  54.5  63.4 
UK  86.5  74.4  68.4  64.9  95.3  92.7  69.2  74.0  79.2  62.4  37.8  40.8 
EU  62.5  52.4  52.9  43.8  94.3  92.4  54.2  68.7  65.2  52.3  28.2  27.9 
Source:  OEeD, Employment Outlook, several years. 
39 Table 5:  Unemployment rates by age and sex in the EU, 1980 and 1995. 
Aged 15-24  Aged 25-54  Aged 55-64 
Men  I  Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Men  I  Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Men  I  Women 
1980  1995  1980  1995 
Austria  n.a.  5.7  n.a.  6.2  n.a.  3.6  n.a.  4.8  n.a.  4.4  n.a.  2.9 
Belgium  10.0  19.7  28.6  23.7  7.2  6.2  15.2  11.1  12.0  3.8  4.3  4.4 
Denmark  17.9  7.8  19.4  12.3  7.4  5.0  8.3  7.6  6.2  6.9  6.5  9.8 
Finland  11.1  41.3  10.5  28.1  5.4  14.6  4.3  14.6  3.6  16.3  5.5  22.8 
France  9.3  21.0  18.6  32.2  3.2  8.8  5.5  12.6  4.1  7.7  5.1  6.6 
Germany  2.9  8.3  5.2  8.0  2.0  6.4  3.8  9.2  5.5  10.7  5.9  13.5 
Greece  16.9  19.4  29.9  37.7  4.7  5.1  8.3  10.9  3.0  3.6  1.8  2.9 
Ireland  10.0  20.5  8.1  17.4  6.6  11.2  4.5  10.9  6.5  7.5  4.4  8.5 
Italy  21.3  29.0  30.7  37.6  1.9  6.7  7.1  12.6  2.0  4.1  7.4  4.9 
Luxembourg  5.4  6.7  7.6  7.8  1.6  1.7  3.9  3.9  .1  .0  3.5  1.0 
Netherlands  7.3  11.5  8.9  12.7  2.9  5.4  2.8  7.9  3.3  3.6  2.7  3.2 
Portugal  10.2  15.1  27.3  17.1  2.4  5.3  7.3  7.0  .3  4.9  .7  2.6 
Spain  17.7  37.0  22.0  49.1  5.7  15.3  4.6  27.5  5.0  12.6  1.1  11.4 
Sweden  4.7  16.7  5.3  14.0  1.3  7.2  1.6  5.9  1.8  8.5  2.2  6.3 
UK  9.2  17.9  8.2  12.2  5.3  8.5  5.5  6.0  7.6  10.1  4.6  3.7 
EU  11.0  19.2  16.5  22.2  4.1  8.0  5.9  11.0  4.4  8.7  4.0  8.2 
Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook, several years. 
40 Table 6:  "Typical" internal rates of return and pension benefits from earnings-
related pension schemes in some EU countries. 
(1)  (1)  (3)  (4) 
Retirement  Benefits  IRR  Pension 
Productivity 
years  (%)  (%) 
Austria  21  1.9%*wage for each year 1-15 plus  3.02  42.5 
1.5%*wage for  each year 16-34 
Belgium  21  .675 4~~5 *lifetime average wages  3.79  32.1 
Finland  20  .575*average wage in 2 of last 4 years  3.00  41.2 
(taking out highest and lowest wage) 
France  22  .5 3r5 *average wage in last 15 years  3.32  30.7 
Germany  20  .7 3/5  *lifetime average wages  2.04  38.6 
Greece  21  .5*average wage in last 5 years  2.70  35.7 
Italy  21  .7*lifetime average wage  1.95  36.9 
Portugal  20  .7*average wage in last 10 years  3.23  48.5 
Spain  22  Average wage in last 15 years  4.03  66.3 
Sweden  22  .6*lifetime average wages  4.94  34.9 
Note:  The ratio of pension to labor productivity is  the average over  the retirement 
period. 
41 Table 7:  Average percentage rates of return on different assets, 1961-96 
USA  Germany  UK  France  Italy  Japan 
GDP growth 
1961-70  3.8  4.3  2.8  5.4  5.6  9.9 
1971-80  2.8  2.7  1.9  3.3  3.5  4.4 
1981-90  2.6  2.2  2.6  2.3  2.2  3.9 
1991-96  2.1  3.2  1.5  1.2  1.0  1.8 
1961-96  2.9  3.1  2.3  3.2  3.3  5.4 
Earnings 
1961-70  4.0  4.5  3.3  5.2  5.2  5.2 
1971-80  2.6  3.0  1.9  3.9  3.6  3.6 
1981-90  2.4  1.3  2.7  1.2  2.2  2.2 
1991-96  2.1  3.2  .6  .8  -.3  -.3 
1961-96  2.8  3.0  2.3  3.0  3.0  3.0 
Long term bonds 
1961-70  1.7  3.0  2.8  2.1  2.2 
1971-80  -.1  2.7  -1.6  .4  -3.4  -.5 
1981-90  5.4  4.7  4.6  5.1  4.4  4.6 
1991-96  4.3  4.0  4.8  5.6  6.5  3.7 
1961-96  2.7  3.6  2.4  3.0  1.9  2.6* 
Stocks 
1961-70  4.8  -4.1  .3  -3.4  1.9 
1971-80  .23  -4.3  -4.5  -4.4  -17.9  4.9 
1981-90  11.5  11.3  9.8  11.1  15.9  15.8 
1991-96  16.5  -.3  5.4  -.1  -4.5  -4.4 
1961-97  7.4  0.8  2.5  .9  -1.8*  5.5 
Notes: *1971-96. 
Earnings:  Rate  of  growth  of  the  compensation  of  employees,  adjusted  for  self-
employment and deflated by  the GDP price deflator.  Long term bonds:  Long-term 
interest rates minus the rate of growth of the GDP Price deflator.  Stocks:  Rate of 
growth of stock indexes minus the rate of growth of the GDP Price deflator (it does 
not include dividends). 
42 
"I Table 8:  Standard deviations and correlations of annual percentage rates of 
return on different assets, 1961-96 
GDP growth  Earnings  Bonds  Stocks 
USA 
GDP growth  2.02 
Earnings  .85  1.74 
Bonds  -.01  -.02  2·48 
Stocks  -.18  -.35  .39  16.70 
Germany 
GDP growth  2.66 
Earnings  .89  2.89 
Bonds  -.10  -.31  1·45 
Stocks  -.07  -.37  .28  16.32 
UK 
GDP growth  1.99 
Earnings  .61  2.11 
Bonds  .35  .09  3.51 
Stocks  .35  -.09  .27  16.25 
France 
GDP growth  1.96 
Earnings  .80  2.19 
Bonds  -.33  -.63  2·47 
Stocks  -.11  -.39  .21  18.73 
Italy 
GDP growth  2.35 
Earnings  .70  2·48 
Bonds  -.27  -.39  4·41 
Stocks  .14*  -.16*  .23*  38.82" 
Japan 
GDP growth  3.53 
Earnings  .69  2·48 
Bonds  .12*  -.34*  4·01* 
Stocks  .20  -.08  .29*  19.08 
Nates: *  1971-96. Standard deviations in italics. 
43 Figure 1:  Exit rates from  the labor force,  average 1994-96 
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Figure 5:  Pension expenditure/GDP by  country.  Baseline simulation 
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year A  Institutional features of pensions systems in the EU 
Table A.I:  The three pillars of pension systems in the EU 
Public pay-as-you-go system 
Flat-rate  Earnings-related schemes 
scheme  Benefits related 
to contributions 
Germany  NO  YES 
France  YES (MT)  YES 
Italy  YES (MT)  YES 
UK  YES  NO 
Ireland  YES (MT)  NO 
Spain  YES (MT)  YES 
Belgium  YES (MT)  YES 
Netherlands  YES  NO 
Portugal  YES (MT)  YES 
Greece  NO  YES 
Denmark  YES (MT)  YES 
Sweden  YES  YES 
Finland  YES (MT)  NO 
Austria  YES (MT)  YES 
MT: Means-tested. 
(1)  (%  private employment, early 1990s) 

















Employers' provided per~ions 
Coverage  Funds 
(1)  (2) 
46  5.8 
less than 10  3.4 
5  1.2 
75  79.4 
40  40.1 
15  2.2 
31  3.4 
85  88.5 
15  n.a 
n.a.  n.a. 
80  20.1 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 


















Sources:  US  Department of Health and Human Resources, Social Security Programmes Throughout the World. 
"I '1:,  .: 
TableA2  Public earnings-related pensions in sample of countries, mid 1990s 
Contribution  Eligibility  Pension  Indexed to  Widow's 
(%)  Age  Contribution  Early  Benetits  Maximum  benetit 
Worker  Firm  (M, W)  years  retirement 
(M,W) 
Aust  10.25  12.55  65,60  15 oflast 30  60,55  1.83% earnings in  best 15 years of first 30 years  80% of  average covered earnings;  Wages  40-60% 
+ 1.675% for each  year 31-45  60% if  early retirement 
Belg  7.5  8.86  65,61  45 (M), 41  (W)  Based on salary & length of work  60-75% average lifetime earnings  CPI  80% 
Denm  33.3  66.7  67  50-66  Based on entry date and contributions  13500 kronerpa (if work 40 years)  Wages  Lump sum 
ofmax of233': 
kroner 
Fin  4.5  16.6  65  40  60  1.5% per year worked (2.5% after age 59)  60-70%  CPI  up to 50% 
Average wage in 2 of  last 4 years (eliminating highest and lowest) 
Fra  6.55  8.2  65  37.5  60  50% of  highest 10 years  50%  CPI  52% 
+GSC& 1.6% 
total payroll 
Ger  10.15  10.15  65,60  at least 5  60  (earnings/ avge earnings] x (years] x 46 DM/month  70% (after 45 years)  Wages  60-100%, 
3 months max 
Gre  < 8.87  <14.73  65,60  4500 days  58,50  30-70%  earnings in  last 5 years  Pensions of  70% 
Civi I servan ts 
Ire  <7.75  <12.2%  66  156 weeks  71-116.5 punts/week  64.5 
punts/wk 
Ita  6  24.5  63,58  50  1.6 - 2 % of  average lifetime earnings  CPI  60% 
Net  16.35  65  1988-2860 guilders (couple); 1430 (single)  Minimum wage  1755 - 2040 
guilders 
Por  7.7  16.7  65  180 months  60  2% of  earnings per year;average annual earnings  80%  CPI  60% 
during highest 10 oflast 15 year 
Spa  4.7  23.6  65  15  60  3.5% (tirst 15 years) + 2.5% (rest);  100% (after 35 years)  CPI  45% 
average oflast 15 years 
Swe  13.0  65  30  60  60% (average of  last 15 years)  Wages  40% 
UK.  <10  <10  65,60  £58.85/ wk + supplement  CPI  £58.85/ wk 
US  6.2  6.2  65  62  Based on lifetime earnings  $2099 / month  CPI  100% 
Jap  8.67  8.67  60,59  25  60  0.75% times months worked  CPI 
Source: US Dept ofHeaIth and Human Resources: Social Security Programmes Throughout the World 